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PHILOSOPHY AND THE CUR RICULUM* 
by 
Israel Scheffler 
Long conceived as primarily a professional subject, the philosophy of education 
has in recent years been developing closer ties with general philosophy. The latter, 
meanwhile, has grown increasingly aware of the significance of education as an 
area of reflection and inquiry! This rapprochement has created new opportunities 
but also new problems: how, fundamentally, to bring philosophical thought to bear 
significantly on educational practice? Many of us have for a long time been critical 
of the old gulf between general philosophy and philosophy of education: we have 
also attacked the inspirational role of the latter in teacher training and its 
presenta1ion in stale typological categories that could only seem artificial in the 
context of the general development of our subject. Yet the old way must be 
conceded to have had its advantages. Though cut off from the philosophical 
mainstream, it was at least acknowledged on all sides as having a legitimate place in 
teacher training. Though over-simplified and often naive in conception, it at least 
addressed issues recognizable to the practitioner. Though frequently artificial in 
structure and treatment, it at least provided a recogn izable traditional framework 
for cour3e development by those assigned to teach it. 
What have we, the critics, proposed to put in its place? We have urged a 
desegregation process. a closer connection between general and educational 
philosophy, in the interests of an enrichment of the former and a sounder and more 
sophisticated development of the latter. These motivations were and, I believe, 
continue to be. worthwhile. They provide challenging options for beneficial in­
tellectual innovallion in a variety of directions. Yet the very diversity of possibilities 
has created a diffuseness of purpose, a hesitancy or ambivalence as to the roads to 
b� taken. The departure from tradition has exacted the usual penalty of unsettled 
directions. amorphous and confused strivings, threatening freedom. Moreover, in 
bringing educational philosophy nearer the condition of general philosophy, the 
desegregation process has produced a new remoteness, by comparison with the 
older tradi:ion. Attention has. naturally. tended to focus increasingly on issues of 
general interest, and the largely analytical cast of contemporary philosophy has, 
moreo,er, invited an increasingly detailed and theoretical development of issues in 
place of a largely practical orientation. With the best will in the world, educational 
philosophers ha,·e been drawn into the delights of the maze, and the road back has 
seemed harder and harder to find. Without a clear channel of address to questions 
of the practitioner, the role of educational philosophy in teacher training has 
become more obscure. 
No one supposes, to be sure, that the philosophers's task is practical engineering 
or applied science. And it should certainly be insisted that the quest for 
philosophical in�ight is generally long and circuitous. ranging far beyond local 
arrangements and predicaments. Yet the linkage o f  philosophical and practical 
concerns must nevertheless be maintained: the continuity of theoretical un-
• All future publication rights reserved by the author. 
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derstanding and the questions of practice must still be affirmed. Even the critics 
aimed, after all, al a desegregation of fields, and desegregation is not achieved by 
swallowing one field whole. The challenge is to create a genuine communication 
between the methods and ideas of current philosophical work and the concerns and 
categories of learning and schooling. The aim is, to be sure, philosophical un­
derstanding, at the level achievable in contemporary inquiry generally, but the 
object of such understanding remains the educational process. 
Nor should it be supposed that the current difficulties of rapprochement that we 
have been describing could somehow have been avoided by a formula, that their 
very existence therefore testifies to human error or blindness. On the contrary, it 
seems to me that such a rapprochement between fields is a genuinely open affair, in 
which the range of potentialities cannot possibly be foreseen and in which a period 
of exploration and experimentation is rather to be anticipated. The old barriers 
were, after all. limiting - they channeled intellectual effort into a relatively small 
set of fixed directions. Like social segregation, they provided a structured system 
hampering the fullest communication between separated segments. Eljmination of 
such hampering conditions does not, in itself, provide new and richer channels; it 
merely sets the stage for their discovery or invention. Such discovery and invention 
are nol automatic products of some magical routine. They depend upon ex­
ploration of objective possibilities in an experimental frame of mind. There is risk 
in such experimentation and there are no guaranteed successes. But there is also no 
turning back to the false security of limited perspectives. The opportunities need to 
be tried. the many pathways explored, in a pluralistic and scientific spirit. If there is 
current unsettlement, there is also the promise of new ideas and new understanding 
to be gained. To bring the rich heritage and contemporary sophistication of 
philosophy into significant relation with the multiple concerns of education 
represents a high challenge to creative effort. 
It is my conviction that no single program ought to dominate in such effort. 
There are many things tha( need doing. Continuity is not the same thing as 
uniformity. It is perfectly compatible with a pluralism of programs and aims; what 
it requires is only that there be connecting paths available for those wbo would 
travel from theory to practice and back again. These paths may themselves be 
diverse; there are footpaths and highways, difficult mountain passes, sea-Janes and 
jet routes. Nor is the construction of a given path the work of one man or program . 
Work in cultivating an isolated area may become significant through the forging by 
others of a remote, though vital, link. The last completed link makes the chain, but 
its significance depends on the availability of all the others. In the linking of 
philosophy and education there are num erous directions to be explored. promising 
rout es, for example. between moral philosophy and studies of character 
development, between epistemology and cognitive psychology, between social 
philosophy and the setting of educational aims, to name but three. In outlining the 
specific attractions of philosophies-of in the remainder of my paper, I would thus 
by no means be understood as denying the claims of other possibilities. Rather, my 
aim is lo develop the indications of promise that seem co me to point in one given 
direction, in the hope that this direction at least will receive some attention. For 
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though many routes are possible, a mere contemplation of lheir several poten· 
tialities will in itself make no oew pathways. My suggestion is that we have, at least 
hl!re. a worthwhile place for constructive work - work that promises, moreover. to 
ti nk philosophy '' ith educational practice in a concrete and articulate manner. 
1 was rirst led to this suggestion several years ago, through teaching certain in· 
troductory phi lo ophy of education courses to prospective teachers, and perhaps I 
may therefore be pardoned for calling upon my personal experience to explain the 
appeal of the idea. The central themes of these courses were taken from 
epistemology, and touched on such topics as knowledge. belief, evidence, truth, 
understanding and explanation. In elaborating these themes in lecture and 
discussion, an effort was made to relate them to educational notions such as 
learning, teaching, and curriculum organization, and illustrations were drawn from 
different tl.!aching areas. Nevertheless, it seemed to me that something more was 
needed to tic the main thread of the course work to particular regions of teaching 
\\�th which the students would be individually concerned upon graduation. For this 
purpose, each student was therefore requested to acquaint himself with the 
philosophical literature bearing on the foundations of his own teaching subject, and 
was further asked to write a paper relating such literarure to selected aspects of 
tt!aching. To facilitate this assignemenl, students were given bibliographies listing 
recent philosophical works bearing on the several teaching areas. e.g. books 
treating of philosophy of mathematics. philosophy of history. philosophy of 
science. philmophy of language, philosophy of art, etc. It was suggested to students 
that they might use the assignmenr as an opportunity to deepen or broaden their 
grasp of their subjects, and they were encouraged tto integrate philosophical with 
any other materials they deemed rele,·ant, in the writing of their papers. 
To my great surprise. I found that the typical student had been simply unaware of 
the existence of a serious philosophical literature relating to his teaching subject; if, 
in a rare instance, n student had known of such a literature, he had practically in no 
case himself in,•estigated it. Moreover, although the assignment seemed generally 
to be undertaken with some trepidation, many students soon reported their delight 
at findirlg a new and fundamental source of insight into materials with which they 
would presenlly be work ing as teachers. Repeated trial over the years has led me lo 
judge the assignment a definite success: it has again and again elicited papers worlh 
reading, in which students reasonably well-trained in their teaching subjects were, 
for the first time. challenged to reflect deeply on the foundations of these subjecLS. 
and to relate their reflections to the task of ceaching. The prior training and the 
imminent prospect of teaching both provided concreteness and focus to the 
philosophical materials; conversely. these materials were immediately seen to have 
point in the framing of general conceptions and selective principles required in 
teaching. And the intitial purpose of the assignment was, moreover, also fulfilled: 
the general epistemological themes of the course were themselves heightened and 
intellectually acth·ated by linkage with the concerns of a particular teaching 
subject. 
I ha"e abo\'e referred to general conceptions and selective principles required in 
teaching. and this is perhaps the central point in seeing the potential contribution 
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of ph�1osophies-of to teacher training. To appreciate the point, we may first 
examine the particular example of philosophy of science, and notice its complex 
relations with scientific practice. The time is now Jong past in which philosophers 
could pretend to a vantage point of superior certitude than is offered by the 
sciences lhemselves. They no longer construe themselves as legislating, from such a 
vantage point, to the scientific practitioner or as taking sides in scientific con­
troversies, at least in their professional capacity. Their philosophical work, insofar 
as it is addressed to science, takes its initial departure from scientific practice itseli, 
striving to describe and codify it, and to understand and criticize it from a general 
epistemological standpoint that is, however, shared by scientists as well. Philosophy 
of science thus springs from scientific practice, but its descriptive and explanatory 
effort. like all second-order reflection on practice, has the potentiality of closing 
lhe circle, of feeding back into practice and altering it. That it springs from practice 
does not prevent it from exercising a critical and reformative function; that it 
exercises such a function does not, on the other hand, mean that it is an in­
dispensable starting point for practice. One can, and regularly does, acquire 
competence within a field of scientific inquiry without preliminary grounding in 
philosophy of science. Even the strongest proponents of the value of the latter field 
of study would not, I believe. wish to argue that every scientist requires prior 
sophistication in this field in order to do his own job ideally well. It is enough that 
che field itself exists and is cultivated in such a way that communication with 
practice is possible. 
Contrast this situation now with that of the teaching of science. The teacher of 
science is, of course, also a practitioner, but his practice is of a critically different 
sort from that of the scientist himself. He needs to have a conception of the field of 
science as a whole, of its aims, methods, and standards; he needs to have principles 
for selecting materials and experiences suitable for inducting novices into the field, 
and he needs to be able to communicate both with novices and with scientific 
sophisticates. Whereas the particular scientific investigator need have no overall 
conception of science but requires only sophistication in his special subject-matter, 
the science teacher's subject-matter embraces scientific thought itself; his 
professional purpose, that is to say, can be articulated only in terms of some in­
clusive conception of scientific activity which it is his object to foster. Whereas the 
scientific researcher need not at all concern himself with the process of training 
others: for research, the science teacher needs to reflect on the proper selection and 
organization of scientific materials for educational purposes, and so to presuppose 
a general perspective on those materials. Whereas, finally, the scientific worker 
requires only sophistication in the special jargon of his intellectual colleagues, the 
reacher requires something more - the ability to step out of the inner circle of 
specialists and to make their jargon intelligible to novices aspiring to 
sophistication. The teacher requires, in other words, a general conceptual grasp of 
science and a capacity to formulate and explain its workings to the outsider. But 
the scope of this requirement is, I suggest, virtually indistinguishable from that of 
the philosophy of science. No matter what additional resources the teacher may 




Scheffler: Philosophy and the Curriculum
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1971
ISRAEL SCH EFFLER 
The philosophy of science is thus, it appears, related to two forms of practice, 
that of scientific investigation and that of science reaching. But these forms of 
practice are themselves diverse in level. U philosophy of science is a second-order 
reflective approach to scientific inquiry, science teaching itself incorporates such a 
second-order reflective approach as well. The science teacher needs to do other 
things than reflect on science. to be sure, but whatever he does is likely to be 
qualified by his second-order reflections on the field of science. Unlike the 
researcher, he· cannot isolate himself within the protective walls of some scientific 
specialty; he functions willy-nilly as a philosopher in critical aspects of his role. And 
his training is, correspondingly. likely to profit from the special contributions that 
philosophy of science offers. 
Analogous considerations apply. I believe, lo the other teaching subjects as well, 
for example, t•O mathematics, ro history, to art, to literature, and so forth. This, it 
seems to me, is the reason why students found the assignment earlier described so 
pertinent lo their work. Their reaction, if it can indeed be generalized, suggests that 
prevalent conceptions of teacher training are curiously restricted. For these 
conceptions typically emphasize three features: subject-mal!:ter competence. 
practice teaching. and the psychology and methodology of teaching. Since subject· 
matter competence is, moreover. interpreted as relating exclusively to rhe first­
order proficiency of the practitioner. no attention is given to the need for a second­
order, or philosophical, perspective on the subject-matter in question. And simce, 
as l have argued, sucb a perspecrive is demanded by the teaching role in any event, 
1he result is that it is gained haphazardly and inefficiently by each teacher, without 
guidance and without awareness of alternatives. Lacking a systematic and critical 
introduction of philosophical considerations, dogmatic and incoherent 
philosophical attitudes are enabled to grow and to proliferate. 
l t  is perhaps worthwhile at this point to attempt a more specific characterization 
of the contributions that philosophies-of might be expected to make. I have already 
suggested Lhat the educator, like the philosopher. seeks a general account of those 
fields represented by teaching subjects. that he requires some reflective grasp of 
the "forms of thought" they might be said to embody. To speak of "forms of 
thought" is of course a simplification, for what is in question relates not only to 
inference but also to categorization, perception, evaluation, decision. attitude, and 
expectation. as crystallized in historical traditions of a variety ·Of sorts. The sim­
plification nevertheless serves. to illuminate a critical point, for forms may be 
embodied as well as articulated. And the successive embodiment of forms of 
thought, which constitutes their perpetuation, does not itself require an articulate 
grasp of their general f ea tu res. To acquire the traditional mental habits of the 
scientist, that is to say, requires only that one learn bow to deal scientifically with 
some range of problems, and to treat critically of the materials bearing upon them. 
The philosopher, on the other hand, takes these very mental habits as his object, 
rather than che scientific problems to which they are, or may be, applied. His task, 
in short, is to articulate and analyze the forms themselves. and to try to understand 
their point. He wants to achieve such comprehensive analytical understanding not 
for some ulterior practical motive, but for its own sake, although he does not. of 
course. deny that understanding may affect practice. 
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The educator. by contrast with tbe philosopher. is concerned with the deliberate 
processes through which forms of thought may be handed on; he strives not only to 
understand these processes but to institute or facilitate them, so that the mental 
habits in question may in fact be properly acquired. Although an articuJate grasp of 
these habits is not required for their acquisition, it is involved in the task of un­
derstanding and facilitating such acquisition. To make his own objectives in­
telligible. the educator needs to be able to analyze and describe those habits which 
it is his purpose to band on to the next generation. An articulate grasp of such 
habits does not. in general, itself figure as part of the content he transmits to 
students; it does not therefore follow that it is of no use to the educator. A parent's 
sophisticated understanding of sexuality is of the utmost usefulness in helping him 
to discusS the issoe with his children. though he would generally be ill advised 
simply to recount such understanding to them. 
If the philosophy-of a given subject is, thus. directed toward the analysis and 
understanding of the form of thought embodied by the subject, it is of potential use 
to the educator in clarifying his own objectives. The educator is not, to be sure, 
necessarily concerned with such understanding for its own sake - he needs it in 
order to facilitate the acquisition of the menial habits in question. Certainly, for this 
larger practical goal. he needs more than clarity of objectives. Equally, however, 
no amount of educational experimentation or psychological information can 
substitute for such clarity. 
Insofar as the analytical understanding of a form of thought is the task of lhe 
philosophy-of that form, it has. then. a contribution to make to education. But such 
contribution does not exhaust its role. Understanding merges with criticism and 
C\'aluation. with issues of justification and appraisal. The philosophy of science, for 
example, is traditionally concerned not oaly to define inductive methods, but to 
evaluate their epistemological warrant, not only to describe forms of probabilistic 
inference, but to inquire into their justification. Analogously, questions of aesthetic 
value, of mathematical certainty, of the reliability of hisrorical reasoning, of the 
function of literature, all relate closely to the question of defining correlated forms 
and Call within the philosophies-of those forms. 
Por the educator, surely. such questions are inescapable. He cannot define his 
role simply as it is given by received traditions; he must be prepared to justify his 
perpetuation or alteration of them as a consequence of his efforts. This means that 
the process of clarifying his objeccives has a critical and normative aspect to it. He 
needs, of course. to strive for a clear grasp of the form of thought embodied in the 
tradition to which he is heir. But in taking on the responsibility of educational 
transmission, he assumes the obligation 0£ evaluating whatever it is in that tradition 
he elects to perpetuate. At the risk of oversimplification. we may say that he 
requires not only a descriptive but a critical clarification of the forms of thought 
represented by bis subject. It goes \\<i.thout saying that philosophies-of do not 
pro"ide the educator with firmly established views of justification; on tbe contrary, 
they present him rather with an array of controversial positions. But this array, 
although it does not fix his direction. liberates him Crom the dogmatisms of 
ignorance, gives him a realistic apprehension of alternati\•es, and outlines relevant 
considerations that have been elaborated in the history of the problem. 
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The analytical understanding and critical appraisal of the form of thought which 
the educator takes as his objective provide him with some help in curriculum 
forma1ion. Wich a general notion of the form in question, he has some idea of 
exemplifications in concrete materials to be employed in teaching. To complete his 
iask. he certainly needs lo call upon elements outside philosophy; he needs in­
dependent acquaintance with materials, and information or hypotheses as to the: 
educational effectiveness of various selections and sequences. But the latter alone 
are also. in themselves, insufficient. For he is concerned to hand on materials, not 
just as materials, but as embodiments or exemplifications of form, that is to say, of 
method, style, aim, approach, and standards. Having a general view of the latter, 
and an independent knowledge of received materials, he can strive to select, shape. 
and order exemplifications so as to satisfy the further demands of educational 
efficiency and comprehensiveness. 
Tn the very process of shaping, philosophies-of make a further contribution, 
which may be illustrated by the philosophy of science once more. For it is clearly a 
mistake to suppose that the latter field is limited to general accounts of scientific 
method. or of inductive reasoning, etc. On the contrary, it embraces also the 
analytical description of historical cases or systematic branches of scientific en· 
deavor in such a way as to bring out their methodological or inferential charac· 
teristics. Such analytical description typically proceeds in two phases: first, a 
refined articulation of the content of the historical inquiry or branclh of science in 
question. and second, a systematic account of the elements of the aniculation and 
their relations, designed primarily to exhibit their methodological or 
epistemological linkages. Philosophy of science is. thus capable of aiding the 
educator not only in formulating a general conception of scientific method, but 
also in processing scientific materials so as to display them as embodiments of that 
method. 
Philosophers. have traditionally undertaken a further task of significance to 
education: the tracing of connections between specialized exemplifications of 
forms of thought and common sense conceptions. They have, that is to say. been 
concerned to interpret, translate, or explicate the content of such exemplifications 
in terms that are intelligible to the non-specialist. To make science generally un· 
derstandable, they have, for example, tried not only to specify the forms of 
reasoning implicit in scientific argumentation, but also to trans�ate or reduce 
particular scientific concepts and theories to those familiar or at least accessible to 
common sense. Assuming the common sense or outsider's point of view as a basis, 
they have attempted to explain the specialized or insider's conceptions in tenns of 
it Ah hough their construals of common sense have varied radically, the function 
fulfilled by their efforts is nevertheless, I believe, of great significance from an 
educational point of view. For the educator is constantly in the position. not only of 
representing and advancing specialized exemplifications of thought. but aJso of 
explaining andl interpreting such exemplifications co the outsider. that is. the 
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To summarize, I have outlined four main efforts through which philosophies-of 
might contribute to education: J) The analytical description of forms of thought 
represented by teaching subjects, 2) The evaluation and criticism of such forms of 
thought, 3) The analysis of specific materials so as to systematize and exhibit them 
as exemplifications of forms of thought, and 4) The interpretation of particular 
exemplifications in terms accessible to the novice. 
My suggestion has been that philosophies-of constitute a desirable additional 
input in teacher preparation, beyond subject-matter competence, practice in 
teaching, and educational methodology. Nor do I wish to suggest, by any means, 
that the matter con,cerns simply the organization of teacher training. On the 
contrary, if the contributions of philosophies-of for teacher training are to be made 
practically available, thought needs to be given to the general process of relating 
such philosophies to education, and I believe that this effort may provide an im­
portan1 focus for educational philosophy. A rich body of materials relative to each 
teaching subject lies ready for such effort, structured in such a way as to make it 
naturally amenable to educational interests. and inviting philosophica� analysis 
pointed toward teaching practice. 
Yet, I by no means wish to suggest that educational philosophy should be wholly 
confined to the direction I have outlined. There is certainly, in my view, a role for 
more general conceptions, even from the point of view of a special interest in 
teacher training. To mention one consideration, the contributions of philosopbies­
of that are outlined above are altogether internal: they relate, for any given 
philosophy-of, to the particular teaching area which is its object. But the educator's 
scope cannot in general be thus confined, even in the case of the teacher whose 
teaching responsibility is limited to one given subject. For even he must concern 
himseH also with external relations: how, for example, if he is a science teacher, 
does his subject relate to mathematics or to the arts, or co literature? How is it 
Jin.kedl to technology? What are its bearings on human values and the enlighten· 
ment of human perception and choice? Analogous questions arise for each 
teaching subject and they require an attempt to deal with relational issues which 
outstrip the scope of any particular philosophy-of - of epistemology, logic, ethics, 
and aesthetics, for example. 
Consider, finally, the fact that teaching subjects cannot be taken without 
question as exclusive and fixed points of the educationaE process. The educator 
needs to consider the possibility of new classifications and interrelations among the 
subjects not only for educational but also for general intellectual purposes. He 
must, further, devote his attention to aspects of human development that are too 
elusive or too central to be encompassed within the framework of subjects, for 
example, the growth of charac1er and the refinement of the emotions. He ought, 
moreover, to reflect on schooling as an institution, its organization within society, 
and its consequences for the career of values. Philosophjes-of represent, I believe, a 
very promising focus for educational philosophy, both with respect to its 
1heoretical development and its potential applications to teacher training. But this 
focus should no! preclude an insistent and continuing recognition of the 
significance of general studies, both philosophical and other. 
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